Interaction between prover & verifier

- NP: Prover sends proof to verifier's certificate tape, then verifier takes over.
- Oracles: Prover is an oracle; verifier asks questions about instances
 of a single problem, prover answers always trusted
- Can we have more general interactions between prover & verifier for cryptography, program checking...?
- Deterministic or randomized verifier? Deterministic or randomized prover?

Our provers will be:

- 4 All-powerful
- On trusted
- Oeterministic

Deterministic prover & verifier

Protocol 1 Deterministic 3SAT

for each clause $C = (l_1 \lor l_2 \lor l_3)$ do Verifier: Values l_1, l_2, l_3 ?

Prover: Send I_1, I_2, I_3 to Verifier

 $\textbf{Verifier: If (all clauses satisfied)} \land (\textbf{all literals consistent)} \ \textbf{then} \ \textbf{ACCEPT else} \ \textbf{REJECT}$

- If m clauses, then we have 2m rounds of (alternate) interaction
- We can have only 2 rounds, where verifier asks for all clauses simultaneously and prover replies
- The verifier speaks last to accept or reject

Definition 1 (Interaction of deterministic functions)

Let $V, P: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ functions. A k-round interaction of V, P on input x is string sequence a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k s.t.

$$a_1 = V(x)$$
 $a_2 = P(x, a_1)$
...
 $a_{2i+1} = V(x, a_1, ..., a_{2i})$
 $a_{2i+2} = P(x, a_1, ..., a_{2i+1})$
...
 $a_k = P(x, a_1, ..., a_{k-1})$

The output of the interaction is $out_{V,P}(x) = V(x, a_1, ..., a_k)$ (0 or 1).

Note: Think of a_{2i+1} as Verifier questions, and a_{2i+2} as Prover replies.

Definition 2 (Deterministic proof system)

L has a k-round deterministic interactive proof system if there is TM V s.t. $V(x, a_1, \ldots, a_i)$ runs in time poly(|x|), can have k-round interactions with provers P, and

$$x \in L \Rightarrow \exists P : out_{V,P}(x) = 1$$
 (Completeness)
 $x \notin L \Rightarrow \forall P : out_{V,P}(x) = 0$ (Soundness)

Definition 3

 $L \in dP$ if L has k(n)-round deterministic interactive proof system where k(n) = poly(n).

Note 1: Both the verifier *and* the number of rounds are polynomial on the size of input |x| = n.

Note 2: $\exists P$ and $\forall P$ above mean $\exists (a_2, a_4, \dots, a_k)$ and $\forall (a_2, a_4, \dots, a_k)$.

Lemma 4

dIP=NP.

Proof:

- $NP \subseteq dIP$: If $L \in NP$ then V is the certifier for L and just asks for a certificate (2 rounds).
- $dIP \subseteq NP$: If $L \in dIP$ then let $a_2, a_4, \ldots, a_{k(n)}$ be the prover answers (our certificate). Certifier gets certificate, runs $V(x) \to a_1, V(x, a_1, a_2) \to a_3, \ldots$, and finally checks $V(x, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{k(n)}) = 1$. Certifier is good because:
 - $x \in L$: \exists Prover answers $a_2, a_4, \ldots, a_{k(n)}$ s.t. everything consistent and $V(x, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{k(n)}) = 1$ (i.e., \exists certificate to make certifier accept)
 - $x \notin L$: \forall Prover answers $a_2, a_4, \ldots, a_{k(n)}$, either inconsistent or $V(x, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{k(n)}) = 0$ (i.e., \forall certificates certifier rejects)

$$\Rightarrow L \in NP$$

What if V is a probabilistic TM?

Example: How can colour-blind Arthur (V) figure out whether Merlin (P) wears socks of different colours? If A deterministic, then M easily tricks him. What if A is probabilistic?

Definition 5 (Probabilistic verifiers with private coins)

L is in IP[k] if there is probabilistic TM *V* with private coins *r* s.t. $V(x, r, a_1, ..., a_i)$ runs in time poly(|x|), can have *k*-round interactions with provers *P*, and

$$x \in L \Rightarrow \exists P : Pr_r[out_{V(r),P}(x) = 1] \ge 2/3$$
 (Completeness)
 $x \notin L \Rightarrow \forall P : Pr_r[out_{V(r),P}(x) = 1] \le 1/3$ (Soundness)

Definition 6

$$IP = \cup_{c>0} IP[n^c].$$

We have:

$$x \in L \Rightarrow \exists P : Pr_r[out_{V(r),P}(x) = 1] \ge 2/3$$
 (Completeness)
 $x \notin L \Rightarrow \forall P : Pr_r[out_{V(r),P}(x) = 1] \le 1/3$ (Soundness)

Lemma 7 (Probability boosting)

We can replace 2/3 by $1-2^{-n^c}$, and 1/3 by 2^{-n^c} for any c>0 without changing IP.

Proof: Same as for BPP (repeat interaction protocol m times and V outputs majority of outputs), apply Chernoff...

Objection: P learns from previous interactions! Yes, but (Soundness) works $\forall P$ (even for P that learns)!

2/3 can be even pushed to 1, i.e., Perfect Completeness! (Non-trivial proof...) Can we push 1/3 to 0, i.e., Perfect Soundness at the same time? If yes, IP = NP!

What about a probabilistic Prover?

$$x \in L \Rightarrow \exists P : Pr_{r,s}[out_{V(r),P(s)}(x) = 1] \ge 2/3$$
 (Completeness) $x \notin L \Rightarrow \forall P : Pr_{r,s}[out_{V(r),P(s)}(x) = 1] \le 1/3$ (Soundness)

It doesn't make any difference (averaging argument)...

Lemma 8

 $IP \subset PSPACE$

Proof:

- Since V runs in $O(n^c)$ time, $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{n^d}$ are of length $O(n^c)$ each, for a total of $O(n^{c+d})$ space.
- Enumerate all $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{n^d}$ to find (consistent) one that maximizes $Pr_r[out_{V(r),P}(x)=1]$ (how to compute this?). If $\geq 2/3$ then ACCEPT, else REJECT.

Graph Isomorphism (GI)

Input: Graphs $G_1 = (V_1, E_1), G_2 = (V_2, E_2)$

Output: ACCEPT if $\exists \pi$ permutation of V_1 labels, so that $\pi(G_1) = G_2$.

Graph Non-Isomorphism (GNI)= \overline{GI}

Lemma 9

 $GI \in NP$ and $GNI \in coNP$

Is $GI \in P$? OPEN

Is GI NP-complete? OPEN

Lemma 10

 $GNI \in IP$

Proof:

Protocol 2 Private coin GNI

V: Pick $i \in_R \{1,2\}$ and random π . Let $H = \pi(G_i)$. Send H to P.

P: Identify which of G_1 , G_2 generated H, say G_j . Send j to V.

V: If i = j then ACCEPT else REJECT

Graphs are socks! If different colour, then P always finds correct i, and

$$Pr_{\mathbf{r}}[out_{V(\mathbf{r}),P}(x)=1]=1$$

If same colour $(G_1 \cong G_2)$, then P can guess i with probability 1/2, i.e.,

$$Pr_{r}[out_{V(r),P}(x)=1] \leq 1/2.$$

Can reduce 1/2 to 2/3 by repetition (Lemma 7).

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Zero knwoeledge proofs (ZKP)

Can P persuade V about the truth of a statement, without revealing any information to V?

Without revealing any information to V: Whatever V learns from interaction with P to prove statement x, it could have computed by itself, without participating in any interaction.

• Restrict to *NP* statements, i.e., statements $x \in L$ for $L \in NP$. Let poly-time TM M s.t.

$$x \in L \Leftrightarrow \exists u \in \{0,1\}^{poly(|x|)} : M(x,u) = 1$$

- ZKP means: P tries to persuade V that it has a certificate u s.t. M(x, u) = 1
- Can define ZKP for other classes, but NP is enough to demonstrate

Definition 11 (Perfect zero knowledge proof)

Let pair of poly-time probabilistic algorithms P, V have interaction $\langle P(x,u),V(x)\rangle$ and $out\langle P(x,u),V(x)\rangle\in\{0,1\}$ be V's output at the end.

• Completeness: If $x \in L$ and u certificate for x (i.e., M(x, u) = 1), then

$$Pr[out\langle P(x,u),V(x)\rangle=1]\geq 2/3$$

• Soundness: If $x \notin L$, then

$$\forall P^*, u : Pr[out\langle P^*(x, u), V(x)\rangle = 1] \leq 1/3$$

• Perfect ZK: \forall poly-time probabilistic V^* , \exists expected poly-time simulator S^* s.t.

$$\forall x \in L, u : Pr[out\langle P(x, u), V^*(x) \rangle = 1] = Pr[S^*(x) = 1]$$

- Perfect ZK relaxed to small statistical distance ⇒ Statistical ZK (SZK)
- ullet Perfect ZK relaxed to computationally indistinguishable \Rightarrow Computational ZK
- People believe $P \subset SZK \subset NP$

Protocol 3 PZK for $GI(G_0, G_1)$

P: Has node label permutation $\pi(G_0) = G_1$ (GI certificate). Picks random permutation π_1 . Sends $\pi_1(G_1)$.

V: Choose random $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Send b.

P: If b = 1 then send π_1 else send $\pi_1 \circ \pi$.

V: H := first message (graph) received; $\pi_2 =$ second message (permutation) received.

If $H = \pi_2(G_b)$ then return 1 else return 0

Completeness: $G_0 \cong G_1 \Rightarrow \pi(G_0) = G_1$.

- If b = 1 then $\pi_2(G_b) = \pi_1(G_1) = H$.
- If b=0 then $\pi_2(G_b)=\pi_1\circ\pi(G_0)=\pi_1(G_1)=H$

$$\Rightarrow Pr[out\langle P(x,u),V(x)\rangle = 1] = 1$$

Soundness: $G_0 \not\cong G_1 \Rightarrow \pi(G_0) \neq G_1$.

- If b = 1 as before (wrong)
- If b = 0 then $\pi_2(G_b) = \pi_1 \circ \pi(G_0) \neq \pi_1(G_1) = H$ (correct)

$$\Rightarrow Pr[out\langle P(x, u), V(x)\rangle = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

Protocol 4 PZK for $GI(G_0, G_1)$

```
P: Has node label permutation \pi(G_0)=G_1 (GI certificate). Picks random permutation \pi_1. Sends \pi_1(G_1). V: Choose random b\in\{0,1\}. Send b. P: If b=1 then send \pi_1 else send \pi_1\circ\pi. V: H:= first message (graph) received; \pi_2= second message (permutation) received. If H=\pi_2(G_b) then return 1 else return 0
```

Perfect ZK: What does V get from P?

- Random permutation of G_1 $(\pi_1(G_1))$
- Either same random permutation π_1 (if b=1) or another random permutation $\pi_1 \circ \pi$

Crucial fact: A permutation of a random permutation is itself a random permutation! Does this reminds us of something?

Yes! XOR $x \oplus y$ of a random x with a number y is also random! (but x, $x \oplus y$ not independent)

AHA! P used random π_1 to mask certificate π !

Protocol 5 PZK for $GI(G_0, G_1)$

```
P: Has node label permutation \pi(G_0) = G_1 (GI certificate). Picks random permutation \pi_1. Sends \pi_1(G_1).

V: Choose random b \in \{0,1\}. Send b.

P: If b=1 then send \pi_1 else send \pi_1 \circ \pi.

V: H:= first message (graph) received; \pi_2= second message (permutation) received. If H=\pi_2(G_b) then return 1 else return 0
```

Simulator $S^*(G_0, G_1)$:

- ① Pick random $b' \in_R \{0,1\}$ and random permutation π_2 . $H := \pi_2(G_{b'})$
- ② Send H to V^* to get b.
- **3** If b = b' then send π_2 to V^* ; return what V^* returns else rerun S^*

$$\Rightarrow Pr[S^*(G_0, G_1) = out\langle P(x, u), V^*(x)\rangle \text{ in 1 iter}] = Pr[b = b'] = 1/2$$

$$\Rightarrow E[T(n)] = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} 2^{-i} V^*(n) = O(V^*(n))$$

Public coins vs. private coins

Definition 12 (AM, MA)

 $AM[k] \subseteq IP[k]$ is class of interactive protocols, where V always reveals the random bits it used to P.

- Book says "V's messages to P contain only its random bits". No need, since if P knows V's random bits up to now, then it can figure out the rest of the message V sends.
- Traditionally, computationally-restricted V called Arthur, and all-powerful P called Merlin. AM[k] if A starts, MA[k] if M starts the interaction.
- AM[2], MA[2] traditionally called AM, MA.
- $AM = BP \cdot NP = \{L : L \leq_r 3SAT\}$ (why?)
- For any constant $k \ge 2$, AM[k] = AM (proof omitted)

Set Lower Bound

Given: Set $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ that $x \in S$ can be certified, i.e., has poly-time

TM M s.t. $x \in S \Leftrightarrow \exists u : M(x, u) = 1$ (so $x \in S$ is an NP question).

Number K with $2^{k-2} < K \le 2^{k-1}$.

Prover: Tries to persuade V that $|S| \ge K$.

Verifier: Rejects with "good" probability if $|S| \leq \frac{K}{2}$.

What about $\frac{K}{2} < |S| < K$? We don't care what V answers! Our first example of a **gap** problem.

Hashing detour

- Hash function $h: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^k$, usually $n \ge k$
- If $x \neq x'$ and h(x) = h(x') then this is a collision
- What is a good hash function?
 - We want x's to be uniformly spread (mapped) to y's, i.e.,
 - We want every $y \in \{0,1\}^k$ to get the same number of pre-images, i.e., $|\{x: h(x)=y\}| = \frac{2^n}{2^k} = 2^{n-k}$.
 - Equivalently, $Pr_x[h(x) = y] = \frac{1}{2^k} = 2^{-k}$ (why?).
 - What if I keep x fixed (like y) and I pick a random h from a family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$ of hash functions? If $Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}_{n,k}}[h(x) = y] = 2^{-k}$ for every x, y then again I have a uniform mapping of x's to y's, and the family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$ is good.

Definition 13 (Pairwise independent hash family)

Hash family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$ is pairwise independent if

$$\forall x \neq x', \forall y, y' : Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}_{n,k}}[h(x) = y \land h(x') = y'] = 2^{-2k}$$

Definition 14 (Pairwise independent hash family)

Hash family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$ is pairwise independent if

$$\forall x \neq x', \forall y, y' : Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}_{n,k}}[h(x) = y \land h(x') = y'] = 2^{-2k}$$

Corollary 1

If family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$ is pairwise independent, then it is also good, i.e., $Pr_{h\in\mathcal{H}_{n,k}}[h(x)=y]=\frac{2^{-k}}{2^{-k}}$.

Proof: We use the following simple fact:

If event space $\Omega = \{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_m\}$, then:

$$Pr[A] = Pr[A \land \Omega] = Pr[A \land (B_1 \lor B_2 \lor \dots \lor B_m)]$$

$$= Pr[(A \land B_1) \lor (A \land B_2) \lor \dots \lor (A \land B_m)]$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{m} Pr[A \land B_1] \text{ (events } A \land B_i \text{ are mutually independent)}$$

Pick any x' and apply with $A \leftarrow h(x) = y$ and $B_i \leftarrow h(x') = y_i$ for all $m = 2^k$ k-strings y_i .

Definition 15 (Pairwise independent hash family)

Hash family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$ is pairwise independent if

$$\forall x \neq x', \forall y, y' : Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}_{n,k}}[h(x) = y \land h(x') = y'] = 2^{-2k}$$

Corollary 2

If family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$ is pairwise independent, then it is also good, i.e.,

$$Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}_{n,k}}[h(x) = y] = 2^{-k}$$
.

Theorem 16

There is a (easily computable) pairwise independent hash family $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}$.

Proof: See Theorem 8.15 in book.

Set Lower Bound (SLB)

Given: Set $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ that $x \in S$ can be certified, i.e., has poly-time

TM M s.t. $x \in S \Leftrightarrow \exists u : M(x, u) = 1$ (so $x \in S$ is an NP question).

Number K with $2^{k-2} < K \le 2^{k-1}$.

Prover: Tries to persuade V that $|S| \ge K$.

Verifier: Rejects with "good" probability if $|S| \leq \frac{\kappa}{2}$.

Protocol 6 Goldwasser-Sipser public-coin protocol for SLB

```
V: Pick random hash function h \in_R \mathcal{H}_{n,k}, pick random y \in_R \{0,1\}^k. Send h, y.
```

P: Try find $x \in S$ s.t. h(x) = y. Send x and certificate u of $x \in S$.

V: If $(h(x) = y \land M(x, u) = 1)$ then return 1 else return 0

Proof intuition: Let $p^* = K/2^k$. If S is big $(|S| \ge K)$ then P has very good chance $(\ge \frac{3}{4}p^*)$ to find x : h(x) = y, but if S is small $(|S| \le K/2)$ its chances fall a lot $(\le \frac{1}{2}p^*)$

Lemma 17

 $SLB \in AM$.

Proof: Let $p^* = K/2^k$. If S is big $(|S| \ge K)$ then P has very good chance $(\ge \frac{3}{4}p^*)$ to find x : h(x) = y, but if S is small $(|S| \le K/2)$ its chances fall a lot $(\le \frac{1}{2}p^*)$

Claim 1

If
$$|S| \le \frac{2^k}{2} < K$$
 and $p = |S|/2^k$, then
$$p \ge Pr_{h,y}[\exists x \in S : h(x) = y] \ge \frac{3p}{4}.$$

- If $|S| \leq \frac{K}{2} \leq 2^{k-2}$ then $p \leq 1/4$ and $3p/4 \geq \frac{3}{8} \frac{|S|}{K}$
- We can boost (Chernoff bound) to $\geq 2/3$, $\leq 1/3$: Run protocol constant M times, V accepts if accepting iterations $\geq 5p^*M/8$.
- Can run in parallel in 2 rounds.

Lemma 18

 $SLB \in AM$.

We have AM protocol to decide whether a set is big or small. We can apply it to show

Theorem 19

 $GNI \in AM$.

Proof:

$$S = \{H : H \cong G_0 \text{ or } H \cong G_1\}$$

- If $G_0 \not\cong G_1$ then |S| = 2n! (S big)
- If $G_0 \ncong G_1$ then |S| = n! (S small)

(not exactly, but this is the main idea)

Lemma 20

 $SLB \in AM$.

We have AM protocol to decide whether a set is big or small. We can apply it to show

Theorem 21

 $GNI \in AM$.

Theorem 22 (Goldwasser-Sipser)

For every $k \ge 2$, IP[k] = AM[k+2].

Proof idea: There is a gap in the number of private random strings making IP[k] V accept in YES and NO instances. Pof AM[k+2] uses SLB to persuade the AM[k+2] V that the number is large.

It can be shown that class AM[k] doesn't change if we require perfect completeness (probability of success for YES instance is 1). Like GNI, every private coin protocol can be transformed to public coin protocol with perfect completeness. We can use this to prove

Theorem 23

If GI is NP-complete, then $\Sigma_2 = \Pi_2$.

Proof: Omitted

Polynomials

- Polynomials defined over fields, e.g., $GF(p) = \{0, 1, 2, ..., p-1\}$ for a prime p (same as *modulo p* arithmetic). GF(2) = binary.
- Univariate polynomial $p(x) = 3x^5 + x^3 0.5x 1$ with deg(p) = 5
- Multivariate polynomial $p(X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4) = 5X_1^3 X_3 X_4 X_2^2 X_3^2 X_4^2 + X_2^5 3$ with deg(p) = 6.
- If $deg(p_1)=d_1$ and $deg(p_2)=d_2$ then $deg(p_1p_2)=d_1+d_2$
- Univariate polynomial of deg(p) = d has at most d roots, i.e. solutions of $p(x) = 0 \Rightarrow$ at most d solutions of p(x) = K.
- If $p \gg d$ for a univariate polynomial of deg(p) = d over GF(p), then very difficult to guess a root, i.e.,

$$Pr_{s \in GF(p)}[p(s) = K] \leq \frac{d}{p}$$

Idea: Use this to catch lying provers! If V has $p_1(x)$ and P sends $p_2(x)$, then $p_1(x) = p_2(x)$ only on d points.

Sumcheck

Given: Polynomial $g(X_1, X_2, ..., X_n)$ over GF(p) for prime p and deg(g) = d, integer K.

Prover: Tries to persuade V that

$$\sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{b_n \in \{0,1\}} g(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n) = K.$$
 (1)

Verifier: Rejects with "good" probability if (1) not true.

Assumption: Polynomial $g(\cdot)$ has a poly(n) representation, and V can evaluate $g(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n)$ in poly(n) time.

- Fully expanded g can have exp(n) number of terms!
- If we set $X_i := b_i$, i = 2, 3, ..., n then we get univariate polynomial $g(X_1, b_2, ..., b_n)$ with deg(p) = d. Define

$$h(X_1) := \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{b_n \in \{0,1\}} g(X_1, \frac{b_2}{b_2}, \dots, \frac{b_n}{b_n})$$

Then
$$(1) \Leftrightarrow h(0) + h(1) = K$$
.

Sumcheck

Given: Polynomial $g(X_1, X_2, ..., X_n)$ over GF(p) for prime p and deg(g) = d, integer K.

Prover: Tries to persuade V that

$$h(0) + h(1) = \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{b_n \in \{0,1\}} g(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n) = K.$$

Protocol 7 Sumcheck IP

```
V: If n=1 then accept only if g(0)+g(1)=K. Else (n\geq 2) ask P to send h(X_1). P: Send polynomial s(X_1). (P can "cheat" by sending s(X_1)\neq h(x_1)) V: If (s(0)+s(1)\neq K) then return 0 else pick random a\in_R GF(p). Recursively check that s(a)\stackrel{?}{=}h(a)=\sum_{b_2\in\{0,1\}}\cdots\sum_{b_n\in\{0,1\}}g(a,b_2,\ldots,b_n)
```

- Completeness: If h(0) + h(1) = K then $s(X_1) = h(X_1)$ and Pr[V accepts] = 1
- Soundness: If $h(0) + h(1) \neq K$ then $Pr[V \text{ accepts}] \leq 1 (1 \frac{d}{p})^n$.

Protocol 8 Sumcheck IP

```
V: If n=1 then accept only if g(0)+g(1)=K. Else (n\geq 2) ask P to send h(X_1). P: Send polynomial s(X_1). (P can "cheat" by sending s(X_1)\neq h(X_1))
V: If (s(0)+s(1)\neq K) then return 0 else pick random a\in_R GF(p). Recursively check that s(a)\stackrel{?}{=}h(a)=\sum_{b_2\in\{0,1\}}\cdots\sum_{b_n\in\{0,1\}}g(a,b_2,\ldots,b_n)
```

• Soundness: If $h(0) + h(1) \neq K$ then $Pr[V \text{ accepts}] \leq 1 - (1 - \frac{d}{n})^n$.

Proof: Induction on n. For n=1 $Pr[V ext{ accepts}] = 0$. True for n=k. For n=k+1: $Pr[V ext{ accepts}] = Pr[(V ext{ accepts round } 3) \land (V ext{ accepts recursively})]$ $= Pr[V ext{ accepts round } 3] \cdot Pr[V ext{ accepts recursively}]$ $\leq Pr[s(a) = h(a)] \cdot (1 - (1 - \frac{d}{p}))^k)$ $\leq \frac{d}{p} \cdot (1 - (1 - \frac{d}{p})^k) = (1 - (1 - \frac{d}{p}))^{k+1}$

Arithmetization

Why bother with **polynomials**? We have seen protocols for problems on graphs, sets, algebra... what about **logic**? **Idea:** Transform **logic to algebra** via arithmetaization.

Given 3CNF formula $\phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$:

- Binary var $x_1 \rightarrow X_1$ variable in GF(p)
- Literal $x_i \to X_i$ and $\bar{x_i} \to 1 X_i$
- $\bullet \ x_i \wedge x_j \to X_i \cdot X_j$
- $x_i \vee x_j \to 1 (1 X_i)(1 X_j)$

Example:

$$C_l = (x_i \lor \bar{x_j} \lor x_k) \to p_l(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = 1 - X_j(1 - X_i)(1 - X_k)$$
 with $deg(p_l) = 3$ (book is wrong on this example!)

$$\Rightarrow P_{\phi}(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = \prod_{i=1}^m p_i(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n),$$
 with $deg(P_{\phi}) \leq 3m$ and representation size $O(m)$ (don't expand!)

3*SAT*

$$\phi(x_1.x_2,...,x_n) \in 3SAT \Leftrightarrow \exists b_i \in \{0,1\}, i = 1,2,...,n : P_{\phi}(b_1,b_2,...,b_n) = 1$$

#SAT

$$\#SAT = \{\langle \phi, K \rangle : 3CNF \text{ formula } \phi \text{ has exactly } K \text{ satisfying assignments} \}$$

Note $\overline{3SAT} \leq_P \#SAT$ (What about 3SAT?)

$$\langle \phi, K \rangle \in \#SAT \Leftrightarrow \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{b_n \in \{0,1\}} P_{\phi}(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n) = K$$

...but this is the Sumcheck problem! Apply Protocol 8 to show

Theorem 24

$$\#SAT \in IP$$

Theorem 25

 $NP, coNP \subseteq IP \subseteq PSPACE$

Proof:

- $\overline{3SAT} \leq_P \#SAT \Rightarrow \overline{3SAT} \in IP$. (We already know $NP \subseteq IP$.)
- All IP interaction and V computations are polynomial time. Go over all possible P answers, to discover optimal P, i.e., maximizes V acceptance probability (once a set of P replies is fixed, V acceptance probability calculated going over all its possible random bits). If best acceptance probability achieved ≥ 2/3 then ACCEPT, else REJECT.

Theorem 26

IP = PSPACE

Proof: We show that $TQBF \in IP$ (we have $PSPACE \subseteq IP$) Proof uses exactly the same ideas that show $\#SAT \in IP$.

Arithmetization for formula $\Psi = \forall x_1 \exists x_2 \forall x_3 \dots \exists x_n \phi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ implies

$$\Psi \in \overline{\mathit{TQBF}} \Leftrightarrow \prod_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \prod_{b_n \in \{0,1\}} P_{\phi}(\textcolor{red}{b_1},\textcolor{blue}{b_2},\ldots,\textcolor{red}{b_n}) = 0$$

This will produce $h(\cdot)$ polynomials of degree 2^n in Protocol 8! We expand arithmetization:

$$\forall X_{i} \ p(X_{1},...,X_{n}) = p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1},0,X_{i+1},...,X_{n})$$

$$\cdot p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1},1,X_{i+1},...,X_{n})$$

$$\exists X_{i} \ p(X_{1},X_{2},...,X_{n}) = p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1},0,X_{i+1},...,X_{n})$$

$$+ p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1},1,X_{i+1},...,X_{n})$$

$$\mathcal{L}X_{i} \ p(X_{1},X_{2},...,X_{n}) = X_{i} \cdot p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1},1,X_{i+1},...,X_{n})$$

$$+ (1 - X_{i}) \cdot p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1},0,X_{i+1},...,X_{n})$$

 $\mathcal{L}X_i$ is a linearization operator that replaces $X_i^k \to X_i$, since $X_i^k = X_i$ if $X_i \in \{0,1\}$.

Use expanded arithmetization to compute polynomials for the following formula:

$$\forall x_1 \mathcal{L}_1 \exists x_2 \mathcal{L}_1 \mathcal{L}_2 \forall x_3 \mathcal{L}_1 \mathcal{L}_2 \mathcal{L}_3 \dots \exists x_n \mathcal{L}_1 \mathcal{L}_2 \dots \mathcal{L}_n \phi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

Note that now

$$h(X_1) = \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \prod_{b_n \in \{0,1\}} P_{\phi}(X_1, b_2, \dots, b_n)$$

has degree k > 1 because of the \prod 's. That's why we linearize X_1 next! (using \mathcal{L}_1). As we go down in the recursion, we will need to also linearize X_2, X_3, \ldots

Read 8.3.3 in text

What is the power of using multiple Provers (MIP)? Play one prover agains the other to force non-adaptability...

Theorem 27

MIP = NFXP

If we define a proof=a table with all Prover answers to Verifier questions, then

Definition 28

PCP[r, q] is set of languages that are accepted by a Verifier that makes q queries to a table of size 2^r .

Theorem 29 (Theorem 27)

NEXP = PCP[poly(n), poly(n)]

Theorem 30 (The PCP theorem)

NP = PCP[O(logn), O(1)]

Program checkers

Program verification problem, i.e. design algorithm C s.t. C(P)=1 iff program P for computation task T is always correct, is undecidable. Program checking on an input problem, i.e. design algorithm C^P with access to code P s.t. $C^P(x)=1$ iff P(x) is correct (P(x)=T(x)) is surprisingly easy if we also allow randomness!

Definition 31 (Blum-Khanna)

A checker for computational task T is a probabilistic poly-time TM C that, given any program P for T and any input x:

- $P(x) = T(x) \Rightarrow Pr[C^P \text{ accepts } P(x)] \ge \frac{2}{3} \text{ (boosting } 1 n^{-k})$
- $P(x) \neq T(x) \Rightarrow Pr[C^P \text{ accepts } P(x)] \leq 1/3 \text{ (boosting } n^{-k})$

...Do such animals even exist?

Program checker for GNI (or GI)

• If $P(G_1, G_2) = 1$ (i.e., P says $G_1 \not\cong G_2$) then C runs:

```
Protocol 9 Private coin GNI
```

```
V: Pick i \in_R \{1,2\} and random \pi. Let H = \pi(G_i). Send H to P. P: Identify which of G_1, G_2 generated H, say G_j. Send j to V. V: If i = j then ACCEPT else REJECT
```

...but using code P instead of P.

```
• If P(G_1, G_2) = 0 (i.e., P says G_1 \cong G_2) then C runs:
     for each i \in V_1 do
         for each i \in V_2 do
             Delete i, j to get G'_1, G'_2
             if P(G'_1, G'_2) = 0 then
                i := \pi(i)
                Move to next i
             else
                 Check correctness of P(G_1', G_2') = 1
                 Move to next i
     if G_1 = \pi(G_2) then
         Return ACCEPT
     else
         Return REJECT
```

Program checkers

We can use IPs to design program checkers in general:

Theorem 32

GI, #SAT, TQBF have checkers.

Theorem 33

P-complete problems have "easy" checkers.