

SFWR ENG 3A04: Software Design II

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Acknowledgments: Material based on *Software Architecture Design* by Tao et al. (Chapter 4)

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1 OO Analysis and Design

- OO Analysis
- OO Design

2 Questions???

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 - Principle of Economy of Mechanism
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Part I

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General Design Principles Overview

- A design process is not to simply identify one possible solution for a problem and then furnish the details of it

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General Design Principles Overview

- A design process is not to simply identify one possible solution for a problem and then furnish the details of it
- A good designer has to identify several alternative designs for a problem

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- These principles build on the ideas of simplicity and restriction

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- A design process is not to simply identify one possible solution for a problem and then furnish the details of it
- A good designer has to identify several alternative designs for a problem
- In the selection process, the designer is guided by design principles
- These principles build on the ideas of **simplicity and restriction**
- **Simplicity makes the proposed solutions easy to understand (Less can go wrong with simple designs)**

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Principle of Low Coupling and High Cohesion

In general:

- Cohesion within a module is the degree to which communication takes place among the module's elements

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In general:

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- Coupling describes the degree to which modules depend directly on other modules

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In general:

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- Coupling describes the degree to which modules depend directly on other modules
- **Effective modularization is accomplished by maximizing cohesion and minimizing coupling**

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In general:

- Cohesion within a module is the degree to which communication takes place among the module's elements
- Coupling describes the degree to which modules depend directly on other modules
- **Effective modularization** is accomplished by maximizing cohesion and minimizing coupling
- **This principle helps to decompose complex tasks into simpler ones**

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


Figure: Cohesion and Coupling

General Design Principles

Principle of Low Coupling and High Cohesion

In the context of OO Design:

- A system with highly inter-dependable classes is very hard to maintain

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In the context of OO Design:

- A system with highly inter-dependable classes is very hard to maintain
- A change in one class may result in cascading updates of other classes

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- We should avoid tight-coupling of classes (Identified using analysis class diagram)

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- A pair of classes which has dependency association on each other is called tightly-coupled

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In the context of OO Design:

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- A change in one class may result in cascading updates of other classes
- We should avoid tight-coupling of classes (Identified using analysis class diagram)
- A pair of classes which has dependency association on each other is called tightly-coupled
- Tight coupling might be removed by introducing new classes or inheritance

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


Figure: Vertical override operation (Used for decoupling)



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We should seek:

- **Less inter-dependency**

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We should seek:

- Less inter-dependency
- **Easy expansion**

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We should seek:

- Less inter-dependency
- Easy expansion
- **Simplicity and elegancy in implementation**

good design \implies simple \wedge elegant

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good design \implies simple \wedge elegant

is equivalent to

\neg simple \vee \neg elegant \implies \neg good design

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- A cohesive class is one that performs a set of closely related operations

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- A cohesive class is one that performs a set of closely related operations
- If a class performs more than one non-related functions, it is said to be lack of cohesion

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- A cohesive class is one that performs a set of closely related operations
- If a class performs more than one non-related functions, it is said to be lack of cohesion
- A lack of cohesion makes the overall structure of the software hard to manage, expand, maintain, and modify

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- **By improving information hiding you will generally be improving the coupling and cohesion**

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- A lack of cohesion makes the overall structure of the software hard to manage, expand, maintain, and modify
- By improving **information hiding** you will generally be improving the coupling and cohesion
- **Information hiding is the hiding of design decisions that are most likely to change (measured through Low Coupling and High Cohesion)**

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


Figure: An initial design of a Professor class

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


Figure: An improved design of a Professor class

General Design Principles

Principle of Low Coupling and High Cohesion

- Low coupled-high cohesion architectures are far easier to modify (changes are more local)

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- Low coupled-high cohesion architectures are far easier to modify (changes are more local)
- The number of top-level packages in an architecture should be small

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General Design Principles

Principle of Low Coupling and High Cohesion

- Low coupled-high cohesion architectures are far easier to modify (changes are more local)
- The number of top-level packages in an architecture should be small
- A range of 7 ± 2 is a useful guideline (projects might vary)

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- Low coupled-high cohesion architectures are far easier to modify (changes are more local)
- The number of top-level packages in an architecture should be small
- A range of 7 ± 2 is a useful guideline (projects might vary)
- The difference between small and large scale projects is the amount of nesting of modules or packages

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- The number of top-level packages in an architecture should be small
- A range of 7 ± 2 is a useful guideline (projects might vary)
- The difference between small and large scale projects is the amount of nesting of modules or packages
- Large scale projects typically organize each top-level package into subpackages
- **The 7 ± 2 guideline applies to each of these**

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One possible architecture for the most common video games consists of four packages.

- The environment in which the game takes place (areas, connections, etc.)

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One possible architecture for the most common video games consists of four packages.

- The environment in which the game takes place (areas, connections, etc.)
- The mechanism controlling the game (encounters, reactions to events, etc.)

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One possible architecture for the most common video games consists of four packages.

- The environment in which the game takes place (areas, connections, etc.)
- The mechanism controlling the game (encounters, reactions to events, etc.)
- The participants in the game (player and foreign characters, etc.)

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- The mechanism controlling the game (encounters, reactions to events, etc.)
- The participants in the game (player and foreign characters, etc.)
- The artifacts involved in the game (swords, books, shields, etc.)

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- The mechanism controlling the game (encounters, reactions to events, etc.)
- The participants in the game (player and foreign characters, etc.)
- The artifacts involved in the game (swords, books, shields, etc.)

Each of these modules is quite cohesive

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Consider how to decompose the design of a personal finance application

- Accounts (checking, savings, etc.)

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Consider how to decompose the design of a personal finance application

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- Bill paying (electronic, by check, etc.)

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Consider how to decompose the design of a personal finance application

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- Reports (total assets, liabilities, etc.)

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- Loans (car, education, house, etc.)

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Weaknesses: Little cohesion in the Accounts module

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Weaknesses: Little cohesion in the Accounts module

Great deal of coupling among these 5 parts

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An alternative architecture

- Assets (checking accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.)

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An alternative architecture

- Assets (checking accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.)
- Sources (employers, rental income, etc.)

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An alternative architecture

- Assets (checking accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.)
- Sources (employers, rental income, etc.)
- Suppliers (landlord, loans, utilities, etc.)

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An alternative architecture

- Assets (checking accounts, stocks, bonds, etc.)
- Sources (employers, rental income, etc.)
- Suppliers (landlord, loans, utilities, etc.)
- Interfaces (user interface, communications interface, reporting, etc.)

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experimental and investigative activity (try alternatives,
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To understand which architecture options are better:
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Should be done at a high level (expensive at low level)

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Open-Closed Principle

The principle urges OO designers to meet two criteria:

- **Open to extension:** the system can be extended to meet new requirements.

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- **Technical approach for achieving Open-Closed Principle is the abstraction via inheritance and polymorphism**

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


Figure: Registering Website Members (Rigid)

General Design Principles

Principle

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


Figure: Registering Website Members (Flexible)

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The Open-Closed Principle has many interesting implications

- Separation of interface and implementation

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- Separation of interface and implementation
- **Keep attributes private**

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- Separation of interface and implementation
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- **Minimize the use of global variables**

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The Open-Closed Principle has many interesting implications

- Separation of interface and implementation
- Keep attributes private
- Minimize the use of global variables
- There are many other important OO design principles

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Principle (Liskov substitution principle)

*Let $q(x)$ be a property provable about objects x of type T .
Then $q(y)$ should be true for objects y of type S where S is
a subtype of T .*

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Principle (Dependency Inversion Principle (DIP) /Inversion of Control)

*High level modules should not depend upon low level modules. Both should depend upon abstractions.
Abstractions should not depend upon details. Details should depend upon abstractions.*

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Principle (Dependency Inversion Principle (DIP) /Inversion of Control)

High level modules should not depend upon low level modules. Both should depend upon abstractions. Abstractions should not depend upon details. Details should depend upon abstractions.

This defines a very powerful rule for designing and programming: **Design to an interface, not an implementation**

Principle (Dependency Inversion Principle (DIP) /Inversion of Control (2))

Packages that are maximally stable should be maximally abstract. Instable packages should be concrete. The abstraction of a package should be in proportion to its stability.

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Principle (Dependency Inversion Principle (DIP) /Inversion of Control (2))

Packages that are maximally stable should be maximally abstract. Instable packages should be concrete. The abstraction of a package should be in proportion to its stability.

In a sense, it follows what has been referred to as the **Hollywood Principle**: **don't call us, we will call you**

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Principle (Interface Segregation Principle)

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
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- A method should have limited knowledge of an object model



Principle (Least Privilege)

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- If a subject does not need an access right, the subject should not have that right
- This is analogue to the "need to know" rule

Principle (Fail-Safe Defaults)

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- This is security version of this principle
- This principle assumes that the default access to an object is none
- If the subject is unable to complete its action or task, it should undo those changes it made in the security state of the system before it terminates
- **Even if the program fails, the system is still safe**

Principle (Economy of Mechanism)

The principle of economy of mechanism states that security mechanisms should be as simple as possible.

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- This principle restricts the caching of information
- When a subject attempts to read an object, the operating system should mediate the action (determines if he is allowed + provides the resources)
- If the subject tries to read the object again, the system should check that the subject is still allowed to read the object

Principle (Open Design)

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- This is especially true of cryptographic software and systems (algorithms kept secret)
- **Keeping cryptographic keys and passwords secret does not violate this principle**

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- This principle is equivalent to the separation of duty principle
- Systems and programs granting access to resources should do so only when more than one condition is met

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- It recognizes the human element in security
- Configuring and executing a program should be as easy and as intuitive as possible
- In practice, the principle of psychological acceptability is interpreted to mean that the security mechanism may add some extra burden, but that burden must be both minimal and reasonable

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