

Syntax and Semantic Systems

..... Notes 31A3

Additional definitions and notes

$\mathcal{B} \subset \mathcal{F}$ is inconsistent if for any $F \in \mathcal{F}$: $\mathcal{B} \vdash F$

In other case, \mathcal{B} is consistent.

\mathcal{B} is decidable if it is consistent and for each F

either $\mathcal{B} \vdash F$ or $\mathcal{B} \vdash \neg F$

Instead of $\mathcal{B} \cup \{G\} \vdash F$ we write $\mathcal{B}, G \vdash F$

Instead of $\{G_1, \dots, G_n\} \vdash F$ we write $G_1, \dots, G_n \vdash F$

Propositional Calculus

..... Notes 3IA3

Def. Boolean function of implication \rightarrow and that of negation $\bar{\quad}$

x	y	$x \rightarrow y$	x	\bar{x}
0	0	1	0	1
0	1	1	1	0
1	0	0		
1	1	1		

Def. We say that $t \in \mathcal{F}$ interprets implication, negation if
 $t(x \rightarrow y) = t(x) \rightarrow t(y)$, $t(\bar{x}) = \overline{t(x)}$

Def. Semantic system of ProC $[\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{ProC}}]$:

$$\mathcal{S}_{\text{ProC}} = \{ t \mid t: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \{0,1\} \text{ \& } t \text{ interprets implication and negation} \}$$

Def. Interpretation $t \in \mathcal{S}_{\text{ProC}}$ is a model of formula $F \in \mathcal{F}$ if $t(F)=1$

Def. Formula F is (semantically) satisfiable if it has a model in $\mathcal{S}_{\text{ProC}}$

Lemma. (Reflexivity of implication) $\vdash F \Rightarrow F$

Proof.

$\vdash F \Rightarrow ((F \Rightarrow F) \Rightarrow F)$	A1
$\vdash (F \Rightarrow ((F \Rightarrow F) \Rightarrow F)) \Rightarrow ((F \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow F)) \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow F))$	A2
$\vdash (F \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow F)) \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow F)$	MP
$\vdash F \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow F)$	A1
$\vdash F \Rightarrow F$	MP

Semantically:

$t(F)$	$t(F) \rightarrow t(F)$
0	1
1	1

i.e., $\models F$

Lemma. Deduction. Let $\mathcal{B} \subset \mathcal{F}$, $F, G \in \mathcal{F}$. Then

$$\mathcal{B}, F \vdash G \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathcal{B} \vdash F \Rightarrow G$$

Remark:

$$F_1, F_2, \dots, F_n \vdash G \quad \text{iff} \quad \vdash F_1 \Rightarrow (F_2 \Rightarrow \dots (F_n \Rightarrow G) \dots)$$

Proof. 1) Let $\mathcal{B} \vdash F \Rightarrow G$. Then we extend the proof by F , and MP will yield $\mathcal{B}, F \vdash G$

2) Let $\mathcal{B}, F \vdash G$. Therefore, there is a proof $C_1, \dots, C_n = G$ from premises \mathcal{B} and F . We proof by induction that $\mathcal{B} \vdash F \Rightarrow C_i$, $i=1, \dots, n$

Additional propositional functors

Def. Disjunction	$F \vee G$	is defined as	$\neg F \Rightarrow G$
Conjunction	$F \& G$	is defined as	$\neg (F \Rightarrow \neg G)$
Equivalence	$F \Leftrightarrow G$	is defined as	$(F \Rightarrow G) \& (G \Rightarrow F)$

Remark. Interpretations of the semantic system interpret the above functors:

$$t(F \& G) = t(F) \cdot t(G), \quad t(F \vee G) = t(F) + t(G),$$

$$t(F \Leftrightarrow G) = t(F) \equiv t(G)$$

where \cdot is boolean product, $+$ boolean sum, \equiv boolean equivalence:

x	y	$x \cdot y$	$x + y$	$x \equiv y$
0	0	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	0
1	1	1	1	1

Priority of the functors:	\neg	$(\forall x)$	$(\exists x)$
	$\&$		
	\vee		
	\Rightarrow	\Leftrightarrow	

Lemma 13.

- 1) $\vdash (F \Rightarrow G) \Rightarrow ((G \Rightarrow H) \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow H))$
 $\vdash (F \Rightarrow G) \& (G \Rightarrow H) \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow H)$ transitivity of implication
- 2) $\vdash \neg F \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow G)$ 1st paradox of implication
- 3) $\vdash F \Rightarrow \neg\neg F$ double negation
 $\vdash \neg\neg F \Rightarrow F$
 $\vdash F \Leftrightarrow \neg\neg F$
- 5) $\vdash (F \Rightarrow G) \Rightarrow (\neg G \Rightarrow \neg F)$ transposition
 $\vdash (F \Rightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow (\neg G \Rightarrow \neg F)$
- 6) $\vdash F \Rightarrow (\neg G \Rightarrow \neg(F \Rightarrow G))$

- 7) $\vdash (\neg F \Rightarrow F) \Rightarrow F$ Clavius law
 $\vdash (F \Rightarrow \neg F) \Rightarrow \neg F$
- 8) $\vdash (F \Rightarrow (G \ \& \ \neg G)) \Rightarrow \neg F$
 $\vdash (F \Rightarrow G) \ \& \ (F \Rightarrow \neg G) \Rightarrow \neg F$ proof by contradiction(see later)

Proof.

..... MFF, ProC, p11-12

Lemma. (Proof by two contradict cases). If $\mathcal{B}, F \vdash G$ and $\mathcal{B}, \neg F \vdash G$ then $\mathcal{B} \vdash G$

Proof.

$\mathcal{B} \vdash F \Rightarrow G$	assumptions
$\mathcal{B} \vdash \neg F \Rightarrow G$	
$\mathcal{B} \vdash \neg G \Rightarrow \neg F$	lemma 13, 5), MP
$\mathcal{B} \vdash (\neg G \Rightarrow \neg F) \Rightarrow ((\neg F \Rightarrow G) \Rightarrow (\neg G \Rightarrow G))$	lemma 13, 1)
$\mathcal{B} \vdash \neg G \Rightarrow G$	MP
$\mathcal{B} \vdash G$	lemma 13, 7)

Lemma. (Proof by contradiction). If $\mathcal{B}, F \vdash G$ and $\mathcal{B}, F \vdash \neg G$, then

$\mathcal{B} \vdash \neg F$

Proof. Following assumptions and

$\vdash G \Rightarrow (\neg G \Rightarrow (G \ \& \ \neg G))$	lemma 19, 3)
$\mathcal{B}, F \vdash G \ \& \ \neg G$	assumptions, MP
$\mathcal{B} \vdash F \Rightarrow (G \ \& \ \neg G)$	deduction lemma
$\mathcal{B} \vdash \neg F$	lemma 13, 8)

Lemma 19.

- 1) $\vdash (F \& G) \Rightarrow F$ implication for conjunction
- 2) $\vdash (F \& G) \Rightarrow G$
- 3) $\vdash F \Rightarrow (G \Rightarrow F \& G)$ or: $F, G \vdash F \& G$
- 4) $\vdash F \& G \Rightarrow G \& F$
 $\vdash F \& G \Leftrightarrow G \& F$ commutative law
- 5) $\vdash F \Rightarrow (F \vee G)$ implication for disjunction
- 6) $\vdash G \Rightarrow (F \vee G)$ or: $F \vdash F \vee G, G \vdash F \vee G$
- 7) $\vdash (F \Rightarrow H) \Rightarrow ((G \Rightarrow H) \Rightarrow (F \vee G \Rightarrow H))$
or: $F \Rightarrow H, G \Rightarrow H \vdash F \vee G \Rightarrow H$
or-elimination
- 8) $\vdash F \vee G \Rightarrow G \vee F$
 $\vdash F \vee G \Leftrightarrow G \vee F$ commutative law
- 9) $\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Rightarrow (F \Rightarrow G)$ from equivalence to implication
- 10) $\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Rightarrow (G \Rightarrow F)$
- 11) $\vdash (F \Rightarrow G) \Rightarrow ((G \Rightarrow F) \Rightarrow (F \Leftrightarrow G))$
- 12) $\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Rightarrow (G \Leftrightarrow F)$
 $\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow (G \Leftrightarrow F)$ commutative law
- 13) $\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Rightarrow (\neg F \Leftrightarrow \neg G)$
 $\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow (\neg F \Leftrightarrow \neg G)$
- 14) $\vdash F \vee \neg F$ true and false
 $\vdash \neg(F \& \neg F)$
- 16) $\vdash \neg(F \& G) \Leftrightarrow \neg F \vee \neg G$ de Morgan laws
 $\vdash \neg(F \vee G) \Leftrightarrow \neg F \& \neg G$
- 17) $\vdash F \& (G \vee H) \Leftrightarrow (F \& G) \vee (F \& H)$ distributive laws
 $\vdash F \vee (G \& H) \Leftrightarrow ((F \vee G) \& (F \vee H))$
- 23) $\vdash (F \Rightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow (\neg F \vee G)$
 $\vdash \neg(F \Rightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow F \& \neg G$
 $\vdash \neg(F \& G) \Leftrightarrow (F \Rightarrow \neg G)$
- 24) $\vdash F \Leftrightarrow F$ reflexivity of equivalence
 $\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow ((F \Leftrightarrow H) \Leftrightarrow (H \Leftrightarrow G))$ transitivity of equiv.
- 25) $\vdash (F \Rightarrow (G \Rightarrow H)) \Leftrightarrow (F \& G \Rightarrow H)$ compound implication

Commutative laws:

$$\vdash F \& G \Leftrightarrow G \& F$$

$$\vdash F \vee G \Leftrightarrow G \vee F$$

$$\vdash (F \Leftrightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow (G \Leftrightarrow F)$$

Associative laws:

$$\vdash ((F \& G) \& H) \Leftrightarrow (F \& (G \& H))$$

$$\vdash ((F \vee G) \vee H) \Leftrightarrow (F \vee (G \vee H))$$

$$\vdash ((F \Leftrightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow H) \Leftrightarrow (F \Leftrightarrow (G \Leftrightarrow H))$$

Proof.

..... MFF, ProC, p.21-22

Def. Let q_1, \dots, q_n be prop. variables, G_1, \dots, G_n formulas, then $Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F)$ is defined as follows:

$$a) Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(p) = G_i \text{ if for some } i=1, \dots, n \quad p=q_i \\ p \text{ otherwise}$$

$$b) Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(\neg F) = \neg Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F)$$

$$c) Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F \Rightarrow G) = Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F) \Rightarrow Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(G)$$

Theorem. Let q_1, \dots, q_n be prop. variables, G_1, \dots, G_n formulas, then for any F :

$$\text{if } \vdash F \text{ then } \vdash Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F)$$

Remark. If $\mathcal{B} \vdash F$ then $Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(\mathcal{B}) \vdash Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F)$

But not: $\vdash F \Rightarrow \nexists Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F)$

Theorem. (Extensionality). Let q_1, \dots, q_n be prop. variables, $G_1, \dots, G_n, G_1', \dots, G_n'$ formulas. Then for each F

$$G_1 \Leftrightarrow G_1', \dots, G_n \Leftrightarrow G_n' \vdash Sb_{G_1, \dots, G_n}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F) \Leftrightarrow Sb_{G_1', \dots, G_n'}^{q_1, \dots, q_n}(F)$$

Proof.

Theorem. Combined system of ProC is complete, i.e., for each \mathcal{B} , F

$$\mathcal{B} \models F \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathcal{B} \models F$$

Proof (at least from left to right).

a) Proof that $\models A1$

$(F \Rightarrow (G \Rightarrow F))$

$t(F)$	$t(G)$	$t(G) \rightarrow t(F)$	$t(F) \rightarrow (t(G) \rightarrow t(F))$
0	0	1	1
0	1	0	1
1	0	1	1
1	1	1	1

Similarly $\models A2, \models A3$

b) Proof $F, F \Rightarrow G \models G$, i.e., proof that for every t :
if $t(F)=1$ and $t(F \Rightarrow G)=1$ then also $t(G) = 1$

$t(F)$	$t(G)$	$t(F \Rightarrow G) = t(F) \rightarrow t(G)$
0	0	1
0	1	1
1	0	0
1	1	1

<<< model for $F, f \Rightarrow G$ is also model for G

||

Example. Prove syntactically/ semantically:

$$\vdash (F \Rightarrow (G \Rightarrow H)) \Leftrightarrow (F \& G \Rightarrow H)$$

$$\models (F \Rightarrow (G \Rightarrow H)) \Leftrightarrow (F \& G \Rightarrow H)$$

..... ProC, A

Example. Prove syntactically/ semantically

$$\vdash p \Rightarrow r, r \Rightarrow s \vdash p \& r \Rightarrow q \& s$$

$$\vdash p \Rightarrow r, r \Rightarrow s \models p \& r \Rightarrow q \& s$$

..... ProC, B

Well-defined formula

Hierarchical tree

..... Book, p.33-34

Literal

Def. Literal is either prop. variable (atom) p or the negation of prop. variable (atom) $\neg p$.

Formula F is in conjunctive normal form (ConjNF) if it is conjunction of disjunction of literals, i.e, corresponding grammar (rewrite) rules:

$$F ::= D \mid D \ \& \ F$$

$$D ::= L \mid L \ \vee \ D$$

$$L ::= \langle \text{prop.variable} \rangle \mid \neg \langle \text{prop.variable} \rangle$$

Formula F is in disjunctive normal form (DisjNF) if it is disjunction of conjunctions of literals.

Lemma 1.43. A disjunction of literals $L_1 \vee \dots \vee L_n$ is semantically valid (tautology) iff there are $1 \leq i, j \leq n$ such that L_i is $\neg L_j$

Proof.

1) If L_i equals $\neg L_j$, then all the interpretations are models for the above disjunction. For example $p \vee q \vee \neg p$

2) Assume that no literal L_k has a matching negation in the above disjunction. Then for each k , $1 \leq k \leq n$, we assign $t(L_k)=0$ if L_k is a prop. variable, or $t(L_k)=1$ if L_k is a negation of prop. variable. E.g., $\neg q \vee p \vee r$ can be made false by $t(p)=0$

From truth-value tables to formulas

..... ProC, C

Conjunctive Normal Form

First, we have to do a preprocessing to get rid of implications by replacing $F \Rightarrow G$ by $\neg F \vee G$ (procedure IMPL).

Then, we have to process negations by using double negation and de Morgan laws (procedure NEG).

Now, we can call the fundamental procedure CNF that converts the formula F to its equivalent ConjNF.

function IMPL(F)

 case

 F is literal: return F
 F is $G \Rightarrow H$: return $\neg \text{IMPL}(G) \vee \text{IMPL}(H)$
 F is $G \& H$: return $\text{IMPL}(G) \& \text{IMPL}(H)$
 F is $G \vee H$: return $\text{IMPL}(G) \vee \text{IMPL}(H)$

 endcase

endfunction

function NEG(F)

 case

 F is literal: return F
 F is $\neg \neg H$: return $\text{NEG}(H)$
 F is $G \& H$: return $\text{NEG}(G) \& \text{NEG}(H)$
 F is $G \vee H$: return $\text{NEG}(G) \vee \text{NEG}(H)$
 F is $\neg(G \& H)$: return $\text{NEG}(\neg G) \vee \text{NEG}(\neg H)$
 F is $\neg(G \vee H)$: return $\text{NEG}(\neg G) \& \text{NEG}(\neg H)$

 endcase

endfunction

function CNF(F)

 case

 F is literal: return F

 F is G&H: return CNF(F) & Cnf(H)

 F is F V H: return DISTR(CNF(G), CNF(H))

 endcase

endfunction

DISTR(G,H): both G, H are in ConjNF. However, if G is a conjunction, say $G = G1 \& G2$ then we must use the distributive law:

$$G \vee H = (G1 \vee H) \& (G2 \vee H)$$

Similarly for H :

function DISTR(G,H)

 case

 G is G1&G2: return DISTR(G1,H) & DISTR(G2,H)

 H is H1&H2: return DISTR(G,H1) & DISTR(G,H2)

 else return G V H //no conjunction

 endcase

endfunction

Conclusion: Any formula F is converted to ConjNF by calling
CNF(NEF(IMPL(F)))

Example. Convert $\neg p \& q \Rightarrow p \& (r \Rightarrow q)$ to ConjNF

..... ProC, D

Predicate Calculus

..... notes 3AI3

Comments.

\forall a quantifier

\exists opposite quantifier

Pred set of predicates of the language \mathcal{L}

Fn set of functors

Const set of constants

Var set of variables

The set $Ss(F)$ of all the substructures of F is the smallest set containing F and with every element, it contains all its substructures.

t_1 is a subterm of t : $t_1 \in Ss(t)$. Notation: $t_1 \triangleleft t$

Similarly: F_1 is a subformula of F : $F_1 \in Ss(F)$. Notation: $F_1 \triangleleft F$

Set of the variables of the term t : $Var(t) = Var \cap Ss(t)$

Def. The set of all variables/ free variables/ bound variables of the formula F : notation: $Var(F)$ / $Fv(F)$ / $Bv(F)$

a) Let F be atomic formula $P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ then

$$Var(F) = \bigcup_{i=1}^n Var(t_i), \quad Fv(F) = Bv(F) = Var(F)$$

b) Let $F = \neg F_1$ then

$$Var(\neg F_1) = Var(F_1), \quad Fv(\neg F_1) = Fv(F_1), \quad Bv(\neg F_1) = Bv(F_1)$$

Similarly for $F = F_1 \Rightarrow F_2$

c) Let $F = (\forall x) F_1$ then

$$Var((\forall x) F_1) = Var(F_1)$$

$$Fv((\forall x) F_1) = Fv(F_1) \setminus \{x\}$$

$$Bv((\forall x) F) = Bv(F_1) \quad \text{if } x \notin Fv(F_1)$$

$$Bv(F_1) \cup \{x\} \quad \text{if } x \in Fv(F_1)$$

Lemma. $\text{Var}(F) = \text{Fv}(F) \cup \text{Bv}(F)$

Definitions.

Formula F is closed if $\text{Fv}(F) = \emptyset$

Formula F is open if there is no x, G so that $(\forall x)G \triangleleft F$.

Formula has clean variables if $\text{Fv}(F) \cap \text{Bv}(F) = \emptyset$ and there is no x, G so that $(\forall x)G \triangleleft F$.

For $(\forall x)F, (\exists x)F$ we say that F minus any substructure of $(\forall x)G, (\exists x)G$ is the scope of $(\forall x), (\exists x)$.

..... MFF, PreC, p. 28

Note. Variable x is free in F if it is a leaf in the hierarchical tree of F and there is no path upwards from x to a node $(\forall x), (\exists x)$.

Variable $x \in \text{Var}(F)$ is bound if it is in the scope of some $(\forall x), (\exists x)$.

..... TextBook, p.104

Def. Substitution of term t_0 for free occurrences of variable x into the term t / formula F : Notion $\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(t) / \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F)$

a) $\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(x) = t_0$

$\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(y) = y$ if $y \neq x$

$\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(c) = c$ if c is a constant

b) $\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(f(t_1, \dots, t_n)) = f(\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(t_1), \dots, \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(t_n))$

c) similarly for $P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$

d) $\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(\neg F) = \neg \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F)$, similarly for $F_1 \Rightarrow F_2$

e) $\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x((\forall x)F) = (\forall x)F$

$\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x((\forall y)F) = (\forall y) \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F)$ if $y \neq x$

Note. Hence, t_0 is substituted for the free variable x in F

Def. Term t_0 is substitutable for variable x into formula F if there is no $(\forall z)G \triangleleft F$ so that $z \in \text{Var}(t_0)$ and $x \in \text{Fv}((\forall z)G)$. Notation: $\text{Subble}(t_0, x, F)$
 Note. Hence, no free variable x in F occurs in the scope of $(\forall z)$, $(\exists z)$ for any variable z in t_0 .

..... TextBook, p. 105, fig. 2.3; p.106-7, fig. 2.4

Lemma 32.

- 0) $F \vdash \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F)$ if $\text{Subble}(t_0, x, F)$
- 1) $\vdash \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F) \Rightarrow (\exists x)F$ if $\text{Subble}(t_0, x, F)$
 $\vdash F \Rightarrow (\exists x)F$
- 2) $\vdash (\forall x)F \Rightarrow (\exists x)F$
- 3) $\vdash (\forall x)(F \Rightarrow G) \Rightarrow ((\forall x)F \Rightarrow (\forall x)G)$
- 4) $\vdash (\forall x)(F \Rightarrow G) \Rightarrow ((\exists x)F \Rightarrow (\exists x)G)$
- 5) $\vdash (\Box x)F \Leftrightarrow F$ if $x \notin \text{Fv}(F)$
- 6) $\vdash (\forall x)(F \Leftrightarrow G) \Rightarrow ((\forall x)F \Leftrightarrow (\forall x)G)$
- 10) $\vdash (\forall x)(F \& G) \Leftrightarrow ((\forall x)F \& (\forall x)G)$
- 11) $\vdash (\exists x)(F \vee G) \Leftrightarrow ((\exists x)F \vee (\exists x)G)$
- 12) $\vdash F$ iff $\vdash \text{Sb}_c^x(F)$ where c is a constant not occurring in F

Proof.

..... MFF, PreC, p. 36, 37, 36b, 36c

Lemma 33. Let $\text{Subble}(t_0, x, F)$ then:

if $\text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash G$ then $(\exists x)F \vdash G$

Lemma 33a.

$\vdash (\Box x)(\Box y)F \Leftrightarrow (\Box y)(\Box x)F$

Example. Prove using L. 33 (different way than L. 32, 4)):

$(\forall x)(F \Rightarrow G), (\exists x)F \vdash (\exists x)G$

Proof.

$(\forall x)(F \Rightarrow G), \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(F) \Rightarrow \text{Sb}_{t_0}^x(G)$

L.32,3); A5

$$\begin{array}{l}
(\forall x)(F \Rightarrow G), Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash Sb_{t_0}^x(G) \quad \text{MP} \\
(\forall x)(F \Rightarrow G), Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash (\exists x)G \quad \text{L.32,1) } \\
(\forall x)(F \Rightarrow G), (\exists x)F \vdash (\exists x)G
\end{array}$$

Example. Prove using L.33 (here $Fv(F)=\{x\}$, $Fv(G)=\{y\}$):

$$(\exists x)F, (\forall x)(\forall y)(F \Rightarrow G) \vdash (\forall y)Q$$

Proof.

$$\begin{array}{l}
(\forall x)(\forall y)(F \Rightarrow G), Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash (\forall y) ((\forall x)F \Rightarrow (\forall x)G) \quad \text{L.33a; L.32,3) } \\
(\forall x)(\forall y)(F \Rightarrow G), Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash (\forall y) (Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \Rightarrow Sb_{t_0}^x(G)) \quad \text{A5} \\
(\forall x)(\forall y)(F \Rightarrow G), Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash (Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \Rightarrow (\forall y)Sb_{t_0}^x(G)) \quad \text{L.32,3) } \\
(\forall x)(\forall y)(F \Rightarrow G), Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash (\forall y)Sb_{t_0}^x(G) \quad \text{MP} \\
(\forall x)(\forall y)(F \Rightarrow G), Sb_{t_0}^x(F) \vdash (\forall y)G \quad \text{L.32,12) } \\
(\forall x)(\forall y)(F \Rightarrow G), (\exists x)(F) \vdash (\forall y)G \quad \text{L.33}
\end{array}$$

Lemma 35. Let $x \notin Fv(G)$. Then

- 1) $(\Box x)(G \Rightarrow F) \Leftrightarrow (G \Rightarrow (\Box x)F)$
- 2) $(\Box x)(F \Rightarrow G) \Leftrightarrow ((\Box x)F \Rightarrow G)$
- 3) $(\Box x)(G \vee F) \Leftrightarrow (G \vee (\Box x)F)$
 $(\Box x)(G \ \& \ F) \Leftrightarrow (G \ \& \ (\Box x)F)$

Proof.

..... MFF, PreC, p. 36b

Lemma 36a. De Morgan laws

$$\vdash \neg(\forall x)F \Leftrightarrow (\exists x)\neg F \quad \vdash \neg(\exists x)F \Leftrightarrow (\forall x)\neg F$$

Def. Variable y is strongly substitutable into F if $y \notin \text{Var}(F)$ and $(\forall y)G \not\vdash F$. Notation: $\text{SSubble}(y, \cdot, F)$

Lemma 36b. (Renaming bound variables) Let $\text{SSubble}(y, \cdot, F)$ then for any variable x :

- 1) $\vdash (\forall x)F \Leftrightarrow (\forall y) Sb_y^x(F)$
- 2) $\vdash (\exists x)F \Leftrightarrow (\exists y) Sb_y^x(F)$

3) If F is closed then $\vdash F \iff \text{Sb}_y^x(F)$
 Proof.

..... MFF, PreC, p. 40

Lemma 38. $\vdash (\exists y)(\forall x)F \implies (\forall x)(\exists y)F$
 Note. Not the other way!

Semantics for PreC

In the syntax system: $\mathcal{B} \vdash F$ if *there is* a proof, i.e., a sequence F_1, \dots, F_n (see its definition). However, $\mathcal{B} \not\vdash F$ if there is *no* proof. We'd have to consider every 'candidate' proof and show it is not one. Thus, syntax system is a 'positive' characterization of the logic: we need to find just one sequence (proof).

Semantics works in the opposite way. To show that $\mathcal{B} \not\models F$ is simple: find an interpretation that is model for \mathcal{B} but not for F . (Interpretation is a model of a formula if it returns 1.)

To show $\mathcal{B} \models F$ is a harder problem (see ProC): indicate that all the interpretations that are models for \mathcal{B} are also models for F .

Thus, semantic system is a 'negative' characterization of the logic.

PreC: We will find that there are infinitely many interpretations.

To encounter $(\exists x)F$ we try to find some instance (concrete value) of x so that F 'holds' (is 1 for an interpretation) for that particular instance of x . Otherwise, if there is no value that satisfies F then 0 is returned.

Similarly, evaluating $(\forall x)F$ means to show that F evaluates to 1 for all possible values (instances) of x . Otherwise, if there is some value of x that does not satisfy F then 0 is returned.

Def. (Relational) structure \mathfrak{M} for the language \mathcal{L} is the 4-tuple
 $[M, \text{Pred}^{\mathfrak{M}}, \text{Fn}^{\mathfrak{M}}, \text{Const}^{\mathfrak{M}}]$

where M is a universum of the structure \mathfrak{M} (set of concrete values)

$\text{Pred}^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is a set that for each $P \in \text{Pred}$ of arity n contains a concrete relation $P^{\mathfrak{M}} \subseteq M^n$ of n -tuples over M

$\text{Fn}^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is a set that for each $f \in \text{Fn}$ of arity n contains a concrete function of the form $f^{\mathfrak{M}} : M^n \rightarrow M$

$\text{Const}^{\mathfrak{M}}$ that for each constant $c \in \text{Const}$ contains a concrete element $c^{\mathfrak{M}} \in M$.

Example. Let $\text{Pred} = \{F, R\}$, $\text{arity}(F) = 1$, $\text{arity}(R) = 2$, $\text{Const} = \{i\}$.
 Let $M = \{a, b, c\}$, $F^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{b, c\}$, $R^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{(a, a), (a, b), (a, c), (b, c), (c, c)\}$, $i^{\mathfrak{M}} = a$.
 Check some formulas for this structure

..... TextBook, p. 125

Homework: TextBook, example 2.16 (p.125-6)

Def. Let \mathfrak{M} be a structure. Evaluation e of variables is the mapping
 $e : \text{Var} \rightarrow M$

Def. Let \mathfrak{M} be a structure, e an evaluation. Value $|t|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e]$ of the term t in \mathfrak{M} with respect to e is defined by induction as follows:

- a) $x \in \text{Var} : |x|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = e(x)$
- b) $c \in \text{Const} : |c|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = c^{\mathfrak{M}}$
- c) $f \in \text{Fn}, \text{arity}(f) = n : |f(t_1, \dots, t_n)|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = f^{\mathfrak{M}}(|t_1|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e], \dots, |t_n|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e])$

Def. Let \mathfrak{M} be a structure, e an evaluation. Value $|F|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e]$ of the formula F in \mathfrak{M} with respect to e is defined as follows:

- a) $P \in \text{Pred}, \text{arity}(P) = n :$
 $|P(t_1, \dots, t_n)|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = 1$ if the n -tuple $(|t_1|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e], \dots, |t_n|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e]) \in P^{\mathfrak{M}}$
 $= 0$ if $(|t_1|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e], \dots, |t_n|^{\mathfrak{M}}[e]) \notin P^{\mathfrak{M}}$
- b) $F = \neg F_1 :$

$$|\neg F|_{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = \overline{|F|_{\mathfrak{M}}[e]}$$

Similarly for $F \Rightarrow F2$

c) $F = (\forall x)F1$:

$$|(\forall x)F1|_{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = 1 \quad \text{if } (\forall m \in M) |F1|_{\mathfrak{M}}[e^{x/m}] = 1$$

where the evaluation $e^{x/m}$ arises from e by
replacing the pair $(x, e(x))$ by (x, m)

$$0 \quad \text{otherwise}$$

Note. $|(\exists x)F1|_{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = 1$ iff $(\exists m \in M) |F1|_{\mathfrak{M}}[e^{x/m}] = 1$

Def. Formula F is (semantically) valid in \mathfrak{M} with respect to e
($\mathfrak{M} \models F[e]$) if
 $|F|_{\mathfrak{M}}[e] = 1$

Def. 1) Formula F is satisfiable if there is some structure \mathfrak{M} and some evaluation e so that $\mathfrak{M} \models F[e]$.

2) Formula F is (semantically) valid in the structure \mathfrak{M} (\mathfrak{M} is a model of F) ($\mathfrak{M} \models F$) if for each evaluation e :

$$\mathfrak{M} \models F[e]$$

3) Formula F is (semantically) valid ($\models F$) if it is valid for all the structures of the language \mathcal{L} .

4) We say that \mathfrak{M} is a model of a set \mathcal{B} of formulas if it is a model of each formula in \mathcal{B} .

4) Let \mathcal{B} be a set of premises, G a formula, then G is (semantically) valid from the premises \mathcal{B} if each model \mathfrak{M} of \mathcal{B} is also the model of G ($\mathcal{B} \models G$).

Note. The symbol \models is overloaded: it is used for $\mathfrak{M} \models F$ as well as for $\mathcal{B} \models F$.

Theorem. PreC is complete, i.e., for each \mathcal{B} , F

$$\mathcal{B} \vdash F \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathcal{B} \models F$$

Undecidability of PreC

Decision problem. A solution to a decision problem is an algorithm (e.g., a program in C) that takes *any* problem instance as its input and *always* terminates, producing a *correct* ‘yes’ or ‘no’ output.

The decision problem of provability in PreC is undecidable, i.e., there is no algorithms which, given any formula F , decides whether $\vdash F$ or $\not\vdash F$.

Gödel’s Theorem.

2nd-order Logic

PreC is 1st-order logic; it processes quantifiers above variables: $(\forall x)$, $(\exists x)$.

2nd-order logic: it also processes quantifiers above predicates: $(\forall P)$, $(\exists P)$.

Resolution Principle