CAS751: IT Metods in Trustworthy ML

Homework 2 - Due: 11/3/2024

Foundations of Differential Privacy

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1. (25 points) Let M be a mechanism, and M_D and $M_{D'}$ be its output distributions when running on datasets D and D', respectively. Let also f_D and $f_{D'}$ be their corresponding densities. Define the following random variable

$$Z_{D,D'} \coloneqq \log \frac{f_D(Z)}{f_{D'}(Z)}, \quad \text{where } Z \sim \mathsf{M}_D.$$

This random variable is typically referred to as *privacy loss random variable*.

(a) Prove that M is ε -DP if and only if

$$\Pr(|Z_{D,D'}| > \varepsilon) = 0,$$

for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D'.

(b) We say that M is (ε, δ) -DP for $\varepsilon \ge 0$ and $\delta \in [0, 1]$ if $\mathsf{E}_{e^{\varepsilon}}(\mathsf{M}_D || \mathsf{M}_{D'}) \le \delta$ for all neighboring datasets D and D'. Prove that M is (ε, δ) -DP if

$$\Pr(Z_{D,D'} > \varepsilon) \leq \delta,$$

for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D'.

- (c) (Bonus: 10 points) Derive an equivalent expression for (ε, δ) -DP in terms of the privacy loss random variables $Z_{D,D'}$. That is, how do you change Part (b) to ensure it is *if and only if*?
- 2. (25 points) Let $D = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be a given dataset and suppose that we want to answer a count query: $q(D) = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$. In class, we learned the Laplace mechanism: simply add Laplace noise with scale parameter $\frac{1}{\varepsilon}$. But what if we did not have access to Laplace noise? Suppose N is a continuous uniform random variable drawn from the interval $\left[-\frac{3}{\varepsilon}, \frac{3}{\varepsilon}\right]$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$. Consider the following mechanism

$$Z_D = q(D) + N.$$

Determine the privacy guarantee of this mechanism.

- 3. (25 points) Consider the following mechanisms M that takes a dataset $D = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \in [0, 1]^n$ and returns an estimate of the mean $q(D) = (\sum_{i=1}^n x_i)/n$. We let Lap(0, b) denote the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale parameter b.
 - (1) $Z_D = [q(D) + Z]_0^1$, for $Z \sim \text{Lap}(0, 2/n)$, where for real numbers y and $r \leq s$, $[y]_r^s$ denotes the "clamping" function:

$$[y]_r^s = \begin{cases} r, & \text{if } y < r, \\ y, & \text{if } r \le y \le s \\ s, & \text{if } y > s. \end{cases}$$

(2) $Z_D = q(D) + [Z]_{-1}^1$, for $Z \sim \text{Lap}(0, 2/n)$. (3)

$$Z_D = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{with probability } q(D), \\ 0, & \text{with probability } 1 - q(D). \end{cases}$$

(4) $Z_D = Z$ where Z has probability density function f_Z given as follows:

$$f_Z(z) = \begin{cases} \frac{e^{-n|z-q(D)|/10}}{\int_0^1 e^{-n|y-q(D)|/10}dy}, & \text{if } z \in [0,1], \\ 0, & \text{if } z \notin [0,1]. \end{cases}$$

(This is an instantiation of the so-called "exponential mechanism".)

- (a) Which of the above mechanisms meet the definition of ε -DP? For what values of ε are they ε -DP (possibly as a function of n)? Note that we are treating n as public knowledge, so it is not a privacy violation to reveal n.
- (b) Consider those mechanisms that satisfy ε -DP. Describe how you would modify these algorithms to have a tunable privacy parameter ε when data domain becomes [a, b] (rather than [0, 1]).
- 4. (Bonus 10 points) Suppose M is a mechanism satisfying $\mathsf{TV}(\mathsf{M}_D,\mathsf{M}_{D'}) \leq \delta$ for all neighboring datasets D, D', where M_D denotes the output distributions of M when running dataset D. In this problem, we wish to show that, depending on the setting of δ , such a definition either does not allow for any useful computations or does not provide sufficient privacy protections. Let n be the size of all possible datasets.
 - (a) $\delta \leq \frac{1}{2n}$. Use properties of total variation to show that $\mathsf{TV}(\mathsf{M}_A, \mathsf{M}_B) \leq \frac{1}{2}$ for all (non-neighboring) datasets A and B. This implies that with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, the output of the mechanism is independent of the dataset. Thus, the mechanism does not convey useful information about datasets.
 - (b) $\delta \geq \frac{1}{2n}$. Argue that in this case, the following trivial mechanism satisfies the above constraint: "with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, the mechanism outputs a random row of the dataset". Since this mechanism is brazenly non-private, the above constraint is a not valid definition for privacy.